JUDGE MILLIGAN: This is the application of the mother of E, born in December 1997, for an injunction restraining the child's father, Mr Kingsley Albert Miller, from publishing by any means material likely to lead to the public identification of the child the subject of these proceedings, or of documents and papers prepared for the purposes of and filed in these proceedings, without leave of the court.
It
is the mother's case that Mr Miller is conducting a politically
motivated campaign for what he sees, or claims to see, as an
infringement of the right of his son E to take part in a continuing
and developing relationship with his father.
The brief background to that is that an order was made by the District Judge in December 1998, when E was one year old, that there be two two-hourly sessions every week of contact, on a Thursday and a Sunday, the District Judge considering such order appropriate, given in particular the age of the child. The matter came before me on appeal in April 1999, the father arguing (as he has since argued against my decision) that both courts were applying discredited child rearing theories in derogation of the child's rights. There being no evidence of any such thing, and applying usual welfare principles, the appeal was dismissed, save for some variation in the times of day.
Later that year, Mr Miller applied to the court on the basis that contact was being deliberately frustrated by the mother by withholding E's feed before contact visits so that the child would identify contact visits with not being fed, to the prejudice of the development of an appropriate father and son bond. There was an application in August of the following year for indirect contact and to receive photographs, which was dismissed on the mother's indication that she was perfectly willing so to agree. By this time there had been no direct contact since August 1999 (and this remains the case), the father's position being that the contact ordered was insufficient so that the right of the child for a developing relationship with his father was not being respected, nor was his standing as the child's father, so that there was unilateral rejection by the father of taking up any further contact.
Because by 6 December 2001, the father had not taken up contact for over two years, an order was made putting an end to direct contact. No application has been made for its reinstatement, to which the mother, as has always been her position, would offer no objection in principle.
Accordingly, this father, who has not taken up contact that was ordered, but has chosen to pursue a political campaign as though his rights and those of the child are being infringed, has pursued his campaign in public with the publication of a pamphlet entitled 'Toddlers Need Parents' and by placing a considerable amount of information and documents concerning the case upon his website, including photographs of the child, orders of the court, and correspondence with the mother's solicitors.
I have been helpfully referred to the case of 'A' v. 'M' [2000] 1 FLR 562, a case where a mother, who had failed to obtain the orders she sought, made allegations to the press, including some relating to matters which the court had rejected, and it was held that the repetition of material about a child, albeit already in the public domain, could be damaging to a child, that there was a substantial risk that the mother would continue to act in the same vein, and that weighing the factors to be taken into account, including the welfare of the children, it was one of those rare occasions where, notwithstanding the existence of powerful contrary public interests, the balance pointed clearly in favour of the injunction being granted.
The brief background to that is that an order was made by the District Judge in December 1998, when E was one year old, that there be two two-hourly sessions every week of contact, on a Thursday and a Sunday, the District Judge considering such order appropriate, given in particular the age of the child. The matter came before me on appeal in April 1999, the father arguing (as he has since argued against my decision) that both courts were applying discredited child rearing theories in derogation of the child's rights. There being no evidence of any such thing, and applying usual welfare principles, the appeal was dismissed, save for some variation in the times of day.
Later that year, Mr Miller applied to the court on the basis that contact was being deliberately frustrated by the mother by withholding E's feed before contact visits so that the child would identify contact visits with not being fed, to the prejudice of the development of an appropriate father and son bond. There was an application in August of the following year for indirect contact and to receive photographs, which was dismissed on the mother's indication that she was perfectly willing so to agree. By this time there had been no direct contact since August 1999 (and this remains the case), the father's position being that the contact ordered was insufficient so that the right of the child for a developing relationship with his father was not being respected, nor was his standing as the child's father, so that there was unilateral rejection by the father of taking up any further contact.
Because by 6 December 2001, the father had not taken up contact for over two years, an order was made putting an end to direct contact. No application has been made for its reinstatement, to which the mother, as has always been her position, would offer no objection in principle.
Accordingly, this father, who has not taken up contact that was ordered, but has chosen to pursue a political campaign as though his rights and those of the child are being infringed, has pursued his campaign in public with the publication of a pamphlet entitled 'Toddlers Need Parents' and by placing a considerable amount of information and documents concerning the case upon his website, including photographs of the child, orders of the court, and correspondence with the mother's solicitors.
I have been helpfully referred to the case of 'A' v. 'M' [2000] 1 FLR 562, a case where a mother, who had failed to obtain the orders she sought, made allegations to the press, including some relating to matters which the court had rejected, and it was held that the repetition of material about a child, albeit already in the public domain, could be damaging to a child, that there was a substantial risk that the mother would continue to act in the same vein, and that weighing the factors to be taken into account, including the welfare of the children, it was one of those rare occasions where, notwithstanding the existence of powerful contrary public interests, the balance pointed clearly in favour of the injunction being granted.
I have considered the matters identified in Re: ' W' [1992] 1 FLR 99 recited in Re: ' A v. M', have borne in mind freedom of expression and of the press, that this is a case where publication is by a dissatisfied father in matters upon which court rulings have been made, but I identify no public interest in favour of publication in all the circumstances of this case or none such as would justify the further harm that would be done to this child by the repeated identification of it in pursuit of a purely political and dishonestly based campaign.
Accordingly, I shall grant the injunctive relief for which the mother prays. I shall make the following order:
'Upon hearing solicitors for the mother Applicant, and upon the Respondent father having been served, but twice indicating by letter that he would not be attending, and having been reminded that orders might therefore be made in his absence, it is ordered
(1) that he, Mr Kingsley Albert Van Miller, be restrained, and an injunction is hereby granted restraining him, whether by himself, his servants or agents, or otherwise howsoever, from disclosing or communicating details of these proceedings or the proceedings in the Court of Appeal (reference 2001/2837) to any third party other than
(i) any legal adviser whom he may consult or instruct,
(ii) any other person with leave of the court;
(2) in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, that he be restrained from publishing any such information on the internet, in booklets or pamphlets, or otherwise howsoever;
(3) he shall forthwith take all necessary steps to remove from his website ...' the remainder of Mr Burge's para
3. No order for
costs save public funding assessment of the mother Applicant's costs,
and I want a penal notice on the bottom.